Jane Manner, Fourth Year Graduate Student in the History Department discusses federal bailouts and the Great Fire of NYC in 1835

           Jane Manners, now in her fourth year of graduate study at Princeton History Department, made a presentation on January 9, 2015, at the Nassau Club in Princeton on her dissertation research. She already has a B.A. and a J.D. from Harvard. Early in her legal study, she developed an interest in legal history.

          Financial bailouts by the federal government are generally seen as a phenomenon that only appeared in the 1980s, but a much earlier instance can be found in the congressional reaction to a devastating fire that occurred in Manhattan on December 16-17, 1835, that leveled approximately seven hundred buildings on twenty-three blocks. The damage amounted to $20,000,000 at a time when the total value of real property in Manhattan was estimated at $400,000,000.

          Merchants affected, including two former secretaries of the treasury, asked congress for assistance. Among other forms of relief, they requested the remission of import duties on the goods that had been destroyed and for additional time for paying future import duties.

          At the time, merchants posted bonds for duties, and most federal revenues were from customs duties. Initially, congress ignored appeals for the remission of duties, although it agreed to the extension of the period for payment to four years. Then, in the summer of 1838, congress enacted a remission of duties for the goods that had been destroyed.

          This bailout was highly paradoxical, owing to the general aversion of the ruling Jacksonians to providing governmental assistance to business or, indeed, involving government with business at all.

          Although not stated precisely in those words, the argument that made the difference was that the New York City merchants were "too big to fail," because of the impact that such an event would have had on the national economy. Thus, the "common good" of the national economy was at stake. Congress received numerous petitions from business people in all parts of the United States. The term "relief" was commonly used to describe the nature of the remission, not "charity," which would have been unpersuasive in view of the prevailing ideology in the early 19th century.

          Opponents of the remission of duties turned the argument on its head by arguing against what they viewed as favoritism to one part of the country.

Critics of the proposal also noted that not a single Manhattan business had failed as a result of its fire losses.

          President Andrew Jackson signed the remission legislation, but beyond that not much is known about his view of the matter. Exploring this topic is an aspect of Ms. Manners dissertation research.

          During the extensive discussion that followed her presentation, she was asked about foreign involvement in the affair, because. European investment was vital to the economic development of the United States during the 19th century. Ms. Manners replied that owing to the failure of all the insurance companies in New York City, merchants had to seek insurance outside the city, including foreign insurers. She noted, too, that New York City effectively loaned $6,000,000 to its insurance companies.

          One member of the audience suggested that this is the story of a skillful campaign to win unmerited advantages.

          Another question related to a possible connection of the controversy over "relief" to Manhattan merchants to the Panic of 1837. Ms. Manners stated that the 1835 fire and its associated problems were mentioned frequently in bankruptcy filings under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.

Doyle K. Hodges, a doctorate candidate in the area of security studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs made a presentation about the relationship between civil-military relations in democratic political systems and compliance with the laws and norms of War at the Nassau Club in Princeton, New Jersey, on October 3, 2014.

Mr. Hodges is a retired naval officer with twenty-one years of service. He commanded two naval vessels, among other assignments. He also taught at the United States Naval Academy.

His career included several periods of duty that required his attention to political and strategic matters. One of those assignments was as an aide to the Naval Inspector General at a time when prisoner abuse in Iraq became public knowledge. Consequently, the Inspector General and his staff, including Mr. Hodges, investigated the treatment of prisoners at the Guantanamo facility and later throughout the navy.

Mr. Hodges noted that the abusive treatment of prisoners in the Global War on Terrorism originated from the civilian political leadership, not from the military. Recognition of that aspect of the problem leads naturally to the study of civil-military relations and its influence on compliance with international standards in the treatment of prisoners.

When intensive interrogation and other potential abusive handling of prisoners seems to be needed, at least in the eyes of some leaders, then there are three choices:       

          1.       Simply to proceed with such procedures, ignoring international

                   norm, the possibilities of adverse publicity, and a decline in

                   morale of the interrogators;

          2.       To refrain from possibly abusive handling of prisoners;

          3.       To "subcontract" abusive measures to the Central Intelligence Agency                (CIA), civilian security contractors, or indigenous governments.

Such a situation creates tension for military authorities whose professional orientation has been largely toward avoiding involvement in political decisions.

Such, at least, is the theory, as heavily influenced by Samuel P. Huntington's study The Soldier and the State (1957), which argued that military professionalism developed in the United States during the 19th century as military leaders focused on purely military concerns and, in most cases, no longer aspired to political office.

This apolitical military self-image has by no means been wholly accurate. Mr. Hodges cited the conflict between President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur about how far United Nations troops should advance into North Korea during the Korean War. Several years earlier, moreover, President Truman and both civilian and uniformed leaders of the navy contended openly about the relative budgetary support that should be given to the air force and the navy. Truman  emerged as the victor in both these controversies, but they demonstrated that political and military decisions cannot be separated neatly.

An important factor in considering the treatment of prisoners is the nature of the adversary. In Vietnam, prisoners taken from the ranks of the North Vietnamese Army were viewed simply as prisoners of war, but guerrillas, who struck United States and allied troops without wearing uniforms, were considered to be in a different category. Similar considerations emerged in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In counterinsurgency conflicts, abuses and violations of international law may be perpetuated by both sides, as, for example, during British efforts to suppress nationalists fighting in the Irish Republican Army and similar guerrilla organizations. The conflict between Israel and Hamas is another example of a situation where behavior on the battlefield has become less sensitive to legal restraints.

Civil-military relations in democracies need an ethical foundation.

In the modern world, liberal democracies often turn to the military services, but those services, in turn, need principles to follow in murky conflicts.

In closing, Mr. Hodges noted that in his studies he is benefiting materially from the diversity of the faculty and student body of the Woodrow Wilson School.